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power of appointment with respect to the withdrawals for the 
year in which death occurred had not lapsed at the time of 
death.14 Therefore, the annual exemption based on the $5,000/ 
five	percent	exemption	rules	do	not	apply.15 This can lead to a 
sizeable inclusion in the gross estate for an estate of considerable 
size.
ENDNOTES
 1  I.R,C. § 2041. See generally 5 Harl, Agricultural Law § 
43.02[7][c]	(2013);	Harl,	Agricultural Law Manual § 5.02[6] 
(2013).
 2  I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1]).
 3  I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1)(A).
 4  I.R.C. § 2041(b)(2).
 5  See Estate of Dietz v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-471.
 6  I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2).
 7  I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1).
 8  Ltr. Rul. 9431004, April 26, 1994 (ranch property included 
in the gross estate of the holder of the power).
 9  I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1)(A). See Forsee v. United States, 76 F. 
Supp. 2d 1135 (D. Kan. 1999) (right to invade corpus (principal) 
to	enhance	“happiness”	not	limited	by	ascertainable	standard;	
corpus of trust included in gross estate). See also Ltr. Rul. 
9344004,	July	13,	1993	(“health,	maintenance,	support,	comfort	
and	welfare”	not	limited	by	ascertainable	standard).
 10  Ltr. Rul. 9419007, Feb. 3, 1994.
 11  See	I.R.C.	§	2041(b)(2);	Treas.	Reg.	§	20.2041-3(d)(3).
 12  See  Estate of Dietz v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-471.
 13  I.R.C. § 2041(b)(2).
 14  Estate of Dietz v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-471.
 15  Id. See also Ltr. Rul. 201216034, Jan. 11, 2012.
Special powers of appointment
	 Powers	which	cannot	be	exercised	 to	benefit	 the	holder	of	
the	 power	 are	 commonly	 referred	 to	 as	 “special”	 powers	 of	
appointment. That category of power, which is unexercised at 
death, does not require inclusion in the gross estate. Likewise, 
exercise of the power in favor of someone other than the holder 
of the power does not have tax consequences for the holder of 
the power. 
 The IRS position is that exercise during life of what purports 
to be a limited power of appointment may be subject to federal 
gift	tax	where	not	exercising	the	power	would	benefit	the	holder	
of the power.10
So-called 5/5 powers
 With this category of power, a non-cumulative right to 
withdraw	up	to	the	greater	of	$5,000	or	five	percent	per	year	of	
the value of assets involved (such as in a bypass trust) can be 
given without subjecting the entire amount of assets involved 
to inclusion in the person’s gross estate.11 As noted above, this 
is a useful concept to include in a will or trust to provide an 
additional	element	of	financial	security	to	a	surviving	spouse,	
for example. 
	 A	key	question:	what	is	included	in	the	beneficiary’s	gross	
estate in the year of death? Such a 5/5 power requires inclusion 
in	the	beneficiary’s	gross	estate	of	the	value	of	the	rights	that	
had not lapsed in the year of death.12 The value of rights that had 
lapsed in prior years is not included in the gross estate, only the 
rights for the year of death. The withdrawals in years before the 
year of death are governed by the provision that mandates that 
the lapse of a power is considered a release of the power to the 
extent that the lapse exceeded in value the greater of $5,000 or 
five	percent	of	the	aggregate	value	of	the	assets	out	of	which	
the	exercise	of	the	power	could	have	been	satisfied.13
 However, the lapse for the year of death is governed by 
general power of appointment rules and the decedent’s general 
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BANkruPTCy
FEDErAL TAXES
 DISCHArGE. The	debtor	filed	for	Chapter	7	in	April	2011.	
In August 2011, the debtor received a refund check based on a 
return for 2005 which was sent in error by the IRS. The debtor 
sent the check back to the IRS but the trustee sought recovery of 
the refund as estate property. The court held that the 2004 taxes 
were non-dischargeable priority taxes because less than three 
years had passed in which the IRS had an opportunity to assess 
the taxes. The three-year limitation on pre-petition taxes was tolled 
by	appeals	filed	by	the	debtor.	In	addition,	the	refund	check	was	
sent	in	error	and	was	never	estate	property;	therefore,	the	trustee	
could not recover the erroneous refund. On appeal, the appellate 
court reversed and remanded the case to determine whether the six 
year limitations period of I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A) applied because 
the taxpayer omitted more than 25 percent of gross income on the 
applicable return. Because the amount of tax was not yet been 
determined in the case, the proper statute of limitations could not 
be determined so as to rule that the taxes were dischargeable.  In re 
Winters, 2013-2 u.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,619 (Bankr. 6th Cir. 
2013), rev’g and rem’g, 2013-1 u.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,173 
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2013).
to attach the original Form 3115 to the electronic return when it 
was	filed.		The	IRS	granted	an	extension	of	time	to	file	the	original	
Form 3115. Ltr. rul. 201351011, Sept. 10, 2013.
 BAD DEBTS. The taxpayer, a family corporation, formed 
a second corporation for the purpose of obtaining minority 
contracting jobs by having a daughter as the owner of the new 
corporation. The taxpayer board meeting minutes showed a vote 
to advance sums to the new corporation but did not establish the 
amount of money intended to be advanced to the new corporation, 
an interest rate for the money advanced, a repayment schedule, 
or any security taken. In addition, no written loan agreement 
was executed nor was any equity interest in the new corporation 
received. The court held that no debtor-creditor relationship was 
established	 between	 the	 corporations;	 therefore,	 no	 bad	 debt	
deduction was allowed for the failure of the new corporation to 
repay any of the amounts advanced by the taxpayer. The appellate 
court	affirmed	in	a	decision	designated	as	not	for	publication.	DF 
Systems, Inc. v. Comm’r, 2013-2 u.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,617 
(5th Cir. 2013).
 BuSINESS EXPENSES. The taxpayer was a college professor 
with positions at three colleges. The taxpayer also made bamboo 
flutes	which	were	sold	at	craft	fairs	or	given	to	friends.	The	taxpayer	
had no records to support the business expenses incurred in the 
flute-making	activity,	claiming	that	the	records	were	destroyed	in	
a	flooded	basement.	However,	the	taxpayer	provided	no	substitute	
records or other substantiation of the expenses other than oral 
testimony. The court held that denial of the deductions was proper 
for	 failure	 to	 provide	 sufficient	 substantiation	of	 the	 expenses.	
Dupre v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2013-287.
 The taxpayer was a lawyer who performed legal services for 
the taxpayer’s brother’s business. The taxpayer incurred expenses 
during one tax year but did not receive reimbursement until the 
next	tax	year.	The	taxpayer	used	cash	basis	reporting;	however,	
the taxpayer did not claim a deduction for the expenses when 
incurred but claimed them when the reimbursements were received. 
The court held that the expenses could not be deducted in the tax 
year following the year the expenses were incurred.  Chaganti v. 
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2013-285.
 COurT AWArDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The taxpayer 
was employed as a college professor and suffered from workplace 
conflicts with the employer and co-workers. The taxpayer 
developed muscle tension and migraine headaches, became 
afraid to go to the university, developed a fear of people, had 
nightmares and was eventually hospitalized for depression. The 
taxpayer’s psychiatrist advised the taxpayer not to return to work 
at the university and diagnosed the taxpayer with severe clinical 
depression, anxiety disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder. 
The taxpayer sued the university for workers’ compensation and 
in negligence for damages. The parties settled for three annual 
equal	payments.	The	taxpayer	did	not	include	the	first	payment	
in taxable income, claiming that it was excludible under I.R.C. 
§ 104(a)(2) as payment received in compensation for a physical 
injury. The settlement agreement provided that the payments were 
for	 “emotional	distress	damages	only.”	The	court	held	 that	 the	
FEDErAL FArM
PrOGrAMS
 OrGANIC FOOD.	The	defendant	was	a	 federally	certified	
organic grower with federal approval to label its organically grown 
herbs	as	USDA	Organic.	The	plaintiff	filed	causes	of	action	for	(1)	
unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation of the California 
Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Calif. Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.);	
(2) violation of the false advertising law (Calif. Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ 17500 et seq.);	(3)	unlawful	conduct	in	violation	of	the	unfair	
competition law (UCL) (Calif. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et 
seq.);	and	(4)	unfair	and	fraudulent	conduct	in	violation	of	the	
UCL. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s herb products 
contained non-organically produced herbs. The defendant argued 
the state consumer law claims alleging noncompliance with 
organic labeling laws were expressly preempted because these 
claims	 implicated	 the	 certification	 process	 under	 the	Organic	
Foods Production Act of 1990 (OFPA) (7 U.S.C. § 6501 et seq.). 
The court agreed with the defendant noting that the federal law 
mandated federal approval and oversight of state organic programs 
to ensure consistent federal and state government enforcement for 
violations of OFPA. Quesada v. Herb Thyme Farms, Inc., 2013 
Cal. App. LEXIS 1041 (Calif. Ct. App. 2013).
 FEDErAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAXATION
 TruSTS. The decedent had established a trust which became 
irrevocable prior to September 25, 1985. Upon the decedent’s 
death, the trust passed to the decedent’s son and provided for 
current and remainder interests to pass to the son’s children. 
The son had three children and, because each party had different 
investment needs, the trust was split into three successor trusts 
under state law. Each trust contained the same provisions as the 
initial trust but had only one child as a current and remainder 
holder	as	well	as	the	son	and	spouse	as	current	beneficiaries.	The	
IRS ruled that the split of the trust into three trusts did not subject 
the trusts to GSTT.  Ltr. rul. 201349002, Aug. 30, 2013.
FEDErAL INCOME 
TAXATION
 ACCOuNTING METHOD. The taxpayer hired an accounting 
firm	to	prepare	and	electronically	file	the	tax	return.	The	return	
reflected	a	change	in	accounting	for	depreciation	purposes	and	
the	taxpayer	filed	duplicate	copies	of	Form	3115,	Application for 
Change in Accounting Method. However, the return preparer failed 
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taxpayer failed to provide evidence that the settlement payment 
was	paid	 in	 compensation	 for	 any	physical	 injuries;	 therefore,	
the payments were not excludible from taxable income. Sharp v. 
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2013-290.
 EDuCATIONAL EXPENSES. The taxpayer enrolled in an 
M.B.A. program in January 2009. During 2009, the taxpayer was 
employed at three jobs sometime during the year, none of which 
required the taxpayer to obtain an M.B.A. to retain employment. 
Two of the jobs involved the sale of cancer pharmaceuticals but 
the	 third	 job	was	not	 linked	 to	any	specific	 type	of	drugs.	The	
taxpayer claimed the tuition expenses as an itemized deduction 
as unreimbursed employee expenses. The court found that the 
taxpayer was not engaged in a trade or business during the tax year 
because the taxpayer’s business activities changed during the tax 
year. Because the education was not a condition of employment 
and was not incurred as part of a trade or business, the court denied 
the deduction for the tuition expenses. Hart v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Memo. 2013-289.
 EMPLOyEE BENEFITS. In a short Chief Counsel Advice 
letter,	 the	 IRS	 ruled:	 “.	 .	 .	 .	 Because	 the	 face	 amount	 of	 the	
employer-provided dependent group-term life insurance exceeds 
$2,000, the insurance is NOT deemed to be a de minimis fringe 
benefit	(see	Notice	89-110).	In	determining	whether	dependent	
group-term life insurance with a face value exceeding $2,000 is 
de minimis or not, we only take into account the excess (if any) of 
the cost of the insurance over the amount paid for the insurance 
by the employee on an after-tax basis. As you conclude, the cost 
of the insurance is determined under section 1.79-3(d)(2) of the 
regulations. A cliff provision does apply in that, if an employer 
provides	a	benefit	that	exceeds	either	the	value	or	the	frequency	
limitations for de minimis	 fringe	benefits,	 the	 entire	 benefit	 is	
included in the employee’s income, not just the portion that 
exceeds the de minimis	limits	(see	Reg.	Section	1.132-6(d)(4)).”	
CCA 201350037, Oct. 25, 2013.
 The IRS has issued guidance on the application of the rules 
under I.R.C. § 125 relating to cafeteria plans, including health 
and	dependent	care	flexible	spending	arrangements	and	I.R.C.	§	
223 relating to health savings accounts, as those two provisions 
relate to the participation by same-sex spouses in certain employee 
benefit	 plans	 following	 the	Supreme	Court	 decision	 in	United 
States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), and the 
issuance of Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-2 C.B. 201. Notice 2014-1, 
I.r.B. 2014-__.
 The IRS has published a revenue ruling providing tables of 
covered compensation under I.R.C. § 401(l)(5)(E) for the 2014 
plan year. rev. rul. 2014-3, I.r.B. 2014-__.
 EMPLOyEE EXPENSES. The taxpayer was a college 
professor with positions at three colleges. The taxpayer claimed 
deductions for unreimbursed employment expenses related to 
the college employment. The court held that the deductions 
were properly denied because the taxpayer failed to provide any 
written records or other substantiation of the expenses and their 
relationship to the taxpayer’s employment. Dupre v. Comm’r, 
T.C. Memo. 2013-287.
 During the two tax years involved, the taxpayer worked on 
a commission basis for a residential real estate development 
company. Each work day, the taxpayer would travel to the 
company’s headquarters and then drive to one of two development 
sites to show and sell homes. The taxpayer maintained travel logs 
on the company’s computer. The taxpayer claimed deductions 
for the mileage costs which were not reimbursed by the company 
and	claimed	a	home	office	deduction	for	the	use	of	two	rooms	
in	 the	 taxpayer’s	 home	 as	 an	 office	 and	display	 area.	 In	 the	
third tax year, the taxpayer terminated employment with the 
company and the company refused to allow the taxpayer access 
to any computer records. The taxpayer did have some receipts 
of gas expenses for a couple of weeks but had no other records 
to substantiate the mileage driven. The court accepted the 
taxpayer’s	testimony	and	few	records	as	sufficient	to	prove	the	
mileage expenses and to allow the deductions. The court allowed 
the	deduction	for	the	home	office,	because	the	taxpayer	did	not	
contest the disallowance for  mortgage interest and because the 
taxpayer failed to substantiate any other indirect costs such as 
utility bills or depreciation information for the home. Powers 
v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2013-106.
 FIrST TIME HOMEBuyEr CrEDIT. When the 
taxpayers married in 2006, the wife owned a residence which 
she had used as a primary residence and which the couple then 
used as their primary residence. The couple separated in 2008. 
The	husband	purchased	 a	 home	 in	 2009	 and	 claimed	 a	first	
time homebuyer credit for the purchase. The couple divorced in 
2011.	The	couple	filed	a	joint	return	for	2009	using	a	translating	
specialist	to	help	prepare	and	file	their	tax	return.	The	court	held	
that	the	husband	was	not	entitled	to	the	first	time	homebuyer	
credit because the husband was considered to own an interest in 
the wife’s home during the time the second home was purchased. 
The court approved the imposition of the accuracy-related 
penalty because the taxpayers did not reasonably rely on the 
translating specialist for tax advice since the specialist did not 
have any training or experience as a tax return preparer. Avilez 
v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2013-99.
 HOME OFFICE. The taxpayer was a college professor with 
positions at three colleges. The taxpayer was provided with an 
office	at	each	college	but	claimed	deductions	for	home	office	
expenses. The court held that the deductions were properly 
denied by the IRS because the taxpayer failed to provide 
evidence	of	the	exclusive	use	of	the	home	office	for	employment	
uses	or	that	the	home	office	was	used	for	the	convenience	of	the	
employers. Dupre v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2013-287.
 IrS PuBLICATIONS. The IRS has announced that a revised 
Pub. 17, Your Federal Income Tax, has been published. Go to 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p17.pdf  Ir-2013-102.
 LEGAL EXPENSES. The taxpayer was a lawyer and during 
a	case	for	a	client,	the	taxpayer	incurred	a	court-imposed	fine	
to be paid to the opposing counsel for failing to have the client 
show up for a deposition. When the taxpayer failed to timely 
pay	that	fine,	the	court	imposed	another	fine	which	was	paid	to	
the court. The taxpayer lost the case and the court ordered the 
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taxpayer to pay the opposing counsel attorney’s fees because of 
the delaying tactics used by the taxpayer. The court held that the 
fine	paid	to	the	court	was	not	eligible	for	a	deduction	for	legal	
expenses. The court did not rule on the deposition fee because 
a material issue of fact remained as to the law used to impose 
that	fine.	Finally,	the	payment	of	the	opposing	attorney’s	fees	
was not eligible for a deduction because such fees were not a 
reasonable or necessary expense since they were due to the 
taxpayer’s misconduct. Chaganti v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 
2013-285.
 LIkE-kIND EXCHANGES. The taxpayers owned a 
residence and a business which were sold together as part of 
the purchase of the business. The taxpayer attempted to obtain 
like-kind exchange treatment for the purchase of a new residence 
by including in the purchase agreement a provision requiring 
the seller to obtain a city permit to use the property as a bed and 
breakfast. No such permit was acquired and the taxpayers moved 
into the residence soon after the purchase. The court held that 
the residence was not like-kind exchange property for the sale 
of the business because the residence was for personal use and, 
therefore,	was	treated	as	“boot.”	The	appellate	court	affirmed.	
yates v. Comm’r, 2014-1 u.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,101 (4th 
Cir. 2013), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 2013-28.
 MOrTGAGE INTErEST. The taxpayer’s brother purchased 
a residence in 2002 with a mortgage loan. The taxpayer began to 
live in the house in 2003 and in 2009 made most of the mortgage 
payments during that year because the brother could not make 
the payments. The taxpayer claimed a deduction for the mortgage 
interest paid. The court held that the taxpayer was not eligible for 
the deduction because the taxpayer had no ownership interest in 
the property and no obligation to make the mortgage payments. 
Puentes v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2013-277.
 PArTNErSHIP
 DISREGARDED ENTITY. The taxpayer was a foreign entity 
eligible	to	elect	to	be	classified	as	a	disregarded	entity	for	federal	
tax purposes and intended to elect to be treated as a disregarded 
entity.	However,	the	entity	failed	to	timely	file	Form	8832,	Entity 
Classification Election. The IRS granted an extension of time 
to	file	Form	8832.	Ltr. rul. 201350002, Aug. 13, 2013.
 LIABILITIES. The IRS has issued proposed regulations 
relating to recourse liabilities of a partnership and the special 
rules for related persons. The proposed regulations provide 
guidance as to when and to what extent a partner is treated 
as bearing the economic risk of loss for a partnership liability 
when multiple partners bear the economic risk of loss for the 
same partnership liability (overlapping economic risk of loss). 
In addition, the proposed regulations provide guidance when 
(1) a partner has a payment obligation with respect to a liability 
or makes a nonrecourse loan to the partnership, (2) no other 
partner bears the economic risk of loss for that liability and (3) 
the partner is related to another partner in the partnership. 78 
Fed. reg. 76092 (Dec. 16, 2013).
 START-UP EXPENSES. The IRS has issued proposed 
regulations concerning the deductibility of start-up expenditures 
and organizational expenses for partnerships following a technical 
termination of a partnership. The IRS has found that some 
taxpayers are taking the position that a technical termination under 
I.R.C. § 708(b)(1)(B) entitles a partnership to deduct unamortized 
start-up expenses and organizational expenses to the extent 
provided under I.R.C. § 165. The proposed regulations amend 
Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1 to provide that a new partnership formed 
due to a transaction, or series of transactions, described in I.R.C. 
§ 708(b)(1)(B) must continue amortizing the I.R.C. §§ 195 and 
709 expenses using the same amortization period adopted by the 
terminating partnership. 78 Fed. reg. 73753 (Dec. 9, 2013).
 PrACTICE BEFOrE IrS. In a Chief Counsel Advice letter, 
the IRS ruled that an individual taxpayer’s immediate family 
member, such as a parent, may represent the taxpayer before 
the	IRS,	including	before	the	Office	of	Appeals.	The	designated	
representative may not represent other taxpayers who are not 
immediate family members, but the scope of practice is not limited 
to examinations or practice before revenue agents and compliance 
personnel. The only exception noted was that the representative 
could not be someone who was otherwise disbarred or suspended 
from practice before the IRS. CCA 201351021, June 13, 2013.
 PENSION PLANS.  For plans beginning in December 2013 for 
purposes of determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C. 
§ 412(c)(7), the 30-year Treasury securities annual interest rate 
for this period is 3.80 percent. The 30-year Treasury weighted 
average is 3.46 percent, and the 90 percent to 105 percent 
permissible range is 3.11 percent to 3.63 percent. The 24-month 
average corporate bond segment rates for December 2013, without 
adjustment by the 25-year average segment rates are: 1.28 for the 
first	segment;	4.05	for	the	second	segment;	and	5.07	for	the	third	
segment. The 24-month average corporate bond segment rates for 
December 2013, taking into account the 25-year average segment 
rates,	are:	4.94	for	the	first	segment;	6.15	for	the	second	segment;	
and 6.76 for the third segment.  Notice 2013-85, I.r.B. 2013-52.
 QuArTErLy INTErEST rATE. The IRS has announced 
that, for the period January 1, 2014 through March 31, 2014, 
the interest rate paid on tax overpayments remains at 3 percent 
(2 percent in the case of a corporation) and for underpayments 
remains at 3 percent. The interest rate for underpayments by large 
corporations remains at 5 percent. The overpayment rate for the 
portion of a corporate overpayment exceeding $10,000 remains 
at 0.5 percent. rev. rul. 2013-25, 2013-2 C.B. 802.
 rETurNS. The IRS has announced that individuals may start 
filing	individual	returns	on	January	31,	2014	and	business	returns	
on January 13, 2014. Many software companies are expected to 
begin accepting tax returns in January and hold those returns 
until the IRS systems open on Jan. 31. The IRS cautioned that 
it will not process any tax returns before Jan. 31, so there is no 
advantage	to	filing	on	paper	before	the	opening	date.	Taxpayers	
will	receive	their	tax	refunds	much	faster	by	using	e-file	or	Free	
File	with	the	direct	deposit	option.		The	April	15	filing	deadline	
is set by statute and will remain in place. Ir-2013-100.
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 SALE OF rESIDENCE. The IRS has issued a Revenue 
Ruling providing guidance to taxpayers as the tax treatment of 
payments to homeowners pursuant to the National Mortgage 
Settlement due to the foreclosure of their principal residences. 
rev. rul. 2014-2, I.r.B. 2014-__.
SAFE HArBOr IN TErEST rATES
January 2014
 Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFr  0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
110 percent AFR 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
120 percent AFR 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
Mid-term
AFr  1.75 1.74 1.74 1.73
110 percent AFR  1.92 1.91 1.91 1.90
120 percent AFR 2.10 2.09 2.08 2.08
  Long-term
AFr 3.49 3.46 3.45 3.44
110 percent AFR  3.85 3.81 3.79 3.78
120 percent AFR  4.19 4.15 4.13 4.11
rev. rul. 2014-1, I.r.B. 2014-2.
 THEFT LOSSES. The taxpayers, husband and wife, invested 
through an investment advisor working for a broker-dealer. The 
taxpayers claimed that the broker committed fraud by using a 
“pump	and	dump”	scheme	by	which	the	broker	purchased	stock,	
encouraged the clients to purchase the stock, and then sold the 
brokerage	 stock	 at	 inflated	prices,	 causing	 the	 stock	price	 to	
drop and resulting in losses for the taxpayers. The broker was 
convicted of securities fraud and the parties were in arbitration, 
in the tax year involved, as to any restitution payments. The 
taxpayers claimed a theft loss deduction for the losses incurred 
through	the	scheme;	however,	the	loss	deductions	were	denied	as	
subject to a reasonable expectation of recovery, at least of some 
of the losses.  The court denied the IRS motion for summary 
judgment but held that losses on some of the stock purchases 
were not entitled to a theft loss deduction because the stock was 
not purchased as part of the fraud scheme. Summary judgment 
was denied because of the existence of material issues of fact 
as to the other stock purchases and whether the taxpayers had 
any reasonable chance of recovery during the tax year the theft 
loss deductions were claimed. Adkins v. united States, 2013-2 
u.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,621 (Fed. Cls. 2013).
INSurANCE
 POLLuTANT. The plaintiffs owned and operated a dairy 
farm with around 600 dairy cows. The plaintiffs purchased 
a farm insurance property and personal liability policy from 
the defendant which covered scheduled property, including 
equipment for handling manure from the dairy operation. The 
policy	expressly	excluded	losses	resulting	from	the	“discharge,	
dispersal,  seepage, migration, release, or escape of ‘pollutants’ 
into	or	upon	land,	water,	or	air”	and	“any	loss,	cost,	or	expense	
arising out of any ... claim or suit by or on behalf of any 
governmental authority relating to testing for, ... cleaning 
up, removing, ... or in any way responding to or assessing the 
effects	of	‘pollutants.’”	Pollutant	is	defined	in	the	policy	as	“any	
solid, liquid, gaseous ... irritant or contaminant, including ... 
waste. Waste includes materials to be recycled, reclaimed, or 
reconditioned,	as	well	as	disposed	of.”		The	plaintiffs	used	the	
covered	equipment	to	spread	manure	on	their	fields	pursuant	to	a	
nutrient	management	plan	prepared	by	a	certified	crop	agronomist	
and approved by the Washington County Land and Water 
Conservation Division. However, the Wisconsin Department of 
Natural	Resources	notified	 the	plaintiffs	 that	manure	from	the	
plaintiffs’ farm had polluted a local aquifer and contaminated 
their neighbors’ water wells. When several neighbors demanded 
compensation,	 the	 plaintiffs	 notified	 defendant	 of	 the	 claims.	
The defendant sought to deny coverage because the manure was 
a	pollutant.	First,	 the	 court	noted	 that	 the	policy	definition	of	
pollutant was so broad as to include almost any substance which 
could be an irritant or cause damage in certain circumstances. 
Therefore,	the	court	followed	the	case	precedent	that	the	definition	
had	to	be	determined	“as	understood	by	a	reasonable	person	in	
the	position	of	the	insured.”		In	this	case,	the	court	found	that	
the plaintiff would not consider manure to be a pollutant but as a 
nutrient	used	as	beneficial	to	production	of	agricultural	products	
for use in the dairy. Therefore, the court held that the defendant 
could not deny coverage for damage caused by manure runoff. 
Wilson Mutual Ins. Co. v. Falk, 2013 Wisc. App. 1031 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 2013).
LANDLOrD AND TENANT
 TErMINATION OF LEASE. The debtor entered into a 10-
year lease of farmland for the purpose of growing and harvesting 
evergreen trees. The rent was $5,000 per year, payable by April 
30, plus $1.50 for each tree cut and removed and $2.25 for each 
tree dug up and removed. The debtor made payments a few days 
late for several years but the payment for April 2011 was in 
dispute and a payment in late 2011 was in dispute as to whether 
it paid for the 2011 or 2012 rent payment. Although there was 
some dispute over the 2013 rent payment, the landlord gave 
notice to the debtor that the contract was terminated on August 
9,	2013.	The	debtor	filed	for	Chapter	12	on	August	14,	2013.	The	
landlord	filed	a	claim	for	2012	and	2013	rent	and	for	payment	for	
harvested trees. The court found that the landlord had not made 
any demand for payment of the amounts claimed, including the 
overdue rent, prior to the termination notice. The court held that, 
under Virginia case law, a lease forfeiture provision cannot be 
enforced	without	a	demand	for	payment;	therefore,	the	lease	in	
this case was not properly terminated. In re keith’s Tree Farm, 
2013 Bankr. LEXIS 5182 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2013).
PrOPErTy
 EASEMENT. The plaintiffs purchased land-locked rural land 
and sued a neighbor, the defendant, for an equitable easement 
that, because the lease had not yet expired, the sale of the cattle in 
February did not violate the lease terms. The trial court found that the 
lease agreement terms were established by the 12 years of dealings 
between the parties consistent with a January to December lease and 
the sale of the defendant’s cattle in October. The trial court awarded 
half of the sale proceeds to each party but ruled that the agister’s lien 
was invalid because the defendant retained an interest in the leased 
land.	On	appeal,	the	appellate	court	affirmed	the	trial	court’s	ruling	
that each party would receive one-half of the proceeds of the sale 
of the cattle, but reversed on the ruling on the agister’s lien. The 
appellate court held that the defendant’s interest in the leased land 
did not affect the validity of the agister’s lien because the cattle were 
entrusted to the plaintiffs who did not own the cattle. Colburn v. 
Hartshorn, 2013 S.D. LEXIS 151 (S.D. 2013).
 The parties entered into a cattle wintering contract under which 
the	defendant	cared	for	the	plaintiff’s	cattle.	The	plaintiff	filed	suit	to	
recover the cattle without payment of the contract amount, arguing 
that no lien was created by the contract in favor of the defendant. 
The trial court agreed with the defendant. On appeal the appellate 
court reversed, holding that the plain terms of the contract provided 
that the plaintiff could not move the cattle before payment of the 
contract amount. Although the court did not hold that the defendant 
had a lien on the cattle, the court held that the effect of the contract 
terms was the same as if an agister’s lien existed. McCoy v. Hock, 
2013 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 126 (Iowa 2013).
STATE TAXATION OF 
AGrICuLTurE
 TErMINATION OF AGrICuLTurAL uSE. The plaintiff 
purchased land which was not zoned as exclusive farm use property. 
The former owner had leased the land to a tenant which used the land 
for farming and the former owner had obtained a special assessment 
as farm land for purposes of property taxes. The lease terminated on 
August	6,	2012	and	the	former	owner	notified	the	county	assessor	on	
August 7, 2012 of the change of use. The sale occurred on August 
10,	2012.	In	May	2013,	the	assessor	notified	the	plaintiff	that	the	
special assessment had terminated and assessed additional taxes 
for the 2012-2013 property tax year. The court held that, although 
the	qualified	use	had	ended	in	August	2012,	the	special	assessment	
occurred on July 1, 2012 and was effective for the entire property 
tax	year,	until	June	30,	2013;	therefore,	the	assessment	of	additional	
property taxes was improper. Boardman Acquisition LLC v. 
Morrow County Assessor, 2013 Ore. Tax LEXIS 209 (Or. Tax 
Ct. 2013).
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over the defendant’s property. The plaintiffs argued that a road, 
formerly designated as a county road, was necessary to access to 
their property. The evidence showed that the plaintiffs did nothing 
to determine whether the road was a public or private road and 
whether any other access was available through other neighbors’ 
lands.	As	the	trial	court	stated,	the	plaintiffs	“rolled	the	dice”	and	
purchased the property without any understanding of the easement 
issues or facts. Indeed, the court pointed out that the plaintiff was 
told by the defendant that no easements existed and that they would 
need to negotiate an easement.  The trial court ruled in favor of the 
defendants and the plaintiffs appealed. On appeal, the appellate 
court	identified	three	criteria	for	imposing	an	equitable	easement	
on a neighbor’s property: (1) The plaintiff must be innocent—the 
encroachment must not be the result of defendant’s willful act, and 
perhaps not the result of defendant’s negligence. (2) If the defendant 
will suffer irreparable injury by the encroachment, the easement 
should not be granted regardless of the injury to plaintiff, except, 
perhaps, where the rights of the public will be adversely affected. 
(3) The hardship to plaintiff by not granting of the easement must 
be greatly disproportionate to the hardship caused to the defendant 
by the continuance of the easement and this fact must clearly appear 
in the evidence and must be proved by the plaintiff. The court held 
that	the	first	factor	weigh	substantially	against	the	plaintiff	and	the	
granting of the easement because the plaintiff negligently failed 
to discover whether the road was a public road or whether any 
easement for access to their property existed prior to purchasing 
the	land.	Although	this	factor	was	sufficient	to	deny	the	easement,	
the court also noted that the plaintiff failed to show that the injury 
to the plaintiff from loss of the easement exceeded the loss to 
the defendant from granting the easement. Lyman v. Plymouth 
Empire Properties, Inc., 2013 Cal. App. unpub. LEXIS 8679 
(Calif. Ct. App. 2013).
SECurED TrANSACTIONS
 AGISTEr’S LIEN. The plaintiffs, husband and wife, leased 
ranch land from the wife’s father, the defendant, for use as a cow-
calf operation. Under an oral agreement, the parties agreed to (1) a 
rent of $20,000 per year, payable one-half on April 1 and one-half 
on November 1, and (2) the plaintiffs’ care of cattle owned by the 
defendant with the plaintiffs receiving one-half of the net proceeds 
from the sale of those cattle in October. The parties operated under 
this agreement for 12 years. In the last year, a dispute arose between 
the plaintiffs and defendant and the defendant’s cattle were not 
sold as usual in October. When the sale of the cattle did not occur, 
the	plaintiffs	filed	an	agister’s	lien	on	the	defendant	for	the	care	of	
the defendant’s cattle in that year. The plaintiffs brought an action 
to sell the cattle and to foreclose on the lien at the rate of $1.34 
per head. The cattle were sold in the following February and the 
proceeds placed in trust pending resolution of this action. At trial, 
the defendant argued that the lease terms were to be identical to 
a prior lease with an unrelated party, under which the lease and 
cattle care agreement ran from April 1 to March 31 of each year 
with rent payments in April and November. The defendant argued 
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